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This chapterhighlights the common elements in procedures for testing
(1) rationality of forecasts in either market or survey data, (2) capital
market efficiency, (3) the short-run neutrality of aggregate demand pol-
icy, and (4) Granger (1969) causality in macroeconometric models. It
answers the following questions: How do the test statistics from these
procedures relate to one another, and can they be used for inference
under quite general conditions?
We will begin with the simplest case and then treat increasingly com-
plex cases. The simplest case, discussed in Section 3.2, involves cross-
equation tests ofrationality when some measure ofexpectations is avail-
able. To make inferences about expectations in the absence of directly
observable expectations, some model ofmarketbehavior is needed. This
case is discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses cross-equation tests
of short-run neutrality of aggregate demand policy. A final section
summarizes the results.
3.2 Test of Rationality
As in Chapter2, let <l>t-l denote the set ofinformation available at the
end ofperiod t - 1, and let E(. .. l<I>t-l) denote the objective expecta-
tion conditional on 4>t-l. Suppose that X t is generated by the following
linear model:
(1)
This chapter is based on joint work with Andrew Abel (Abel and Mishkin 1983).
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where
Z1 t-1 and Z2 t-1 = vectors of variables known at time t - 1,
, 0.1; 0.2 = coefficients,
Ut =error term which is assumed to have the property
that E(utl<f>t-l) = O.
Thedistinction betweenZ1,t-l andZ2,t-l is thatZ2,t-l includesvariables
relevantfor forecasting X t butignored by the econometricianin conduct-
ing tests ofrationality. Of course Z2,t-1 could be empty. It is clear from
(1) that the objective expectation of Xt, conditional on <f>t-l, is
(2) E(Xtl<f>t-l) = Zl,t-l 0.1 + .22,t-l0.2'
Now consider a one-period-ahead forecast X~, which is some observ-
able measure of an expectation of Xt made at time t - 1. Rationality of
expectations requires that the forecast X~ must equal the objective ex-
pectationofX tconditionalon<Pt-l: that is, X~ = E(Xtl<Pt-l)' Thusin the
following equation,
(3)
rationality implies that 0.1 ='-ai, 0.2 = (1.1 and Vt is identically zero.
However, in dealing with actual data on expectations, the following
weaker definition of rationality is used which allows for a nonzero
observation error vt :
(4)
This definition still requires that 0.1 = o.i and 0.2 = 0.1, yet it allows the
observation error Vt to be nonzero with the restriction that E(Vtl<Pt-l) =
O. If Vt is identically zero, then X~ is a minimum-variance unbiased
forecast ofXt. Replacingthe restriction thatvt beidenticallyzerowith the
restriction that E(Vtl<Pt-l) = 0 will remove the minimum variance prop-
erty of X~ but not the unbiasedness conditional on <Pt-l'
Observe that (4) implies that the forecast error is uncorrelated with
information in <f>t_l' This implicationofrational expectationsis the basis
for the following test procedure. The null hypothesis of rationality is
tested by testing the coefficient w = 0 in the regression equation
(5)
when Tit = error term where E('Yltl<Pt-l) is assumed to equalzero. This is
the most common test ofrationality used, for example, to study forward
rate forecasts in the foreign exchange market (see Levich 1979).
The effect of ignoring relevant information in this test becomes clear
whenequation (3) is subtractedfrom (1) to obtainthe following equation
for the forecast error:
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Recall that rationality implies that a1 - ai == 0, a2 - a1 == 0, and
E (ut - vtl <Pt- 1) == o. Therefore, under the hypothesis ofrationality, the
coefficientwestimated from the OLS regression ofXt - X~ on Zl,t-1 in
(5) will be a consistentestimateofa1 - ai andshould notbesignificantly
different from zero. This follows directly from the orthogonality ofZt-1
and TIt ['TIt == Z2,t-1(a2 - (1) + Ut - vt]. Notethatunderrationalitywis a
consistent estimate of a1 - ai even if Z2, which is the set of relevant
variables excluded from the regression, is not empty. Thus leaving out
relevantvariablesfromtheOLSregression (5) will notaffecttherational-
ity implication that wshould not differ significantly from zero.
Anotherway ofstating the point is that the test described here is a test
ofrationality no matterwhat available past information is included in Zl
(or no matter what information is excluded from the regression equa-
tion). That is, plim wcan differ from zero only if there is a violation of
rationality. However, it is possible that plim wcould equal zero even in
the presence of irrationality. For example, suppose that a1 == ai,
E (ut - vtl <Pt- 1) == 0 and Z2 is orthogonal to Z1, yet there is irrationality
because a2 =F a1. In this case, plimw== O. Therefore, a failure to reject
the null hypothesis, even asymptotically, does not rule out irrationality
because, in this case, the probability ofType II error does not go to zero
as the sample size goes to infinity.
Studies that test for the rationality ofsurvey forecasts (Pesando 1975;
Carlson 1977; Mullineaux 1978; Friedman 1980) use the following




Xt == Zl,t-1 ~ + Ult,
X~ == Zl,t-1 ~* + U2t,
where
~, ~* == coefficients
Ult, U2t == error terms where E(U1tl<pt-1) and E(U2tl<Pt-1) are assumed
to equal zero.
As is pointed out in Modigliani and Shiller (1973), rationality of
expectations requires that plim:y == plim:Y*. This implication ofrational-
ity becomesclearifwesupposethat Z2, thesetofvariables excludedfrom
the regressions in (7) and (8), is empty; that is, the regressions in (7) and
(8) containall informationin <Pt-1 relevantforforecastingXt. Inthis case,
:y and :y* are each consistent estimates ofa1 under the null hypothesis of
rationality, and they should not differ significantly. One way to test
~ == ~* is to stack (7) and (8) into a single regression and perform a Chow
(1960) test for the equality ofcoefficients (see Pesando 1975). However,
if the variance ofresiduals in (7) differs, as is likely, from the variance of47 An Integrated View
residualsin (8), a correctionmustbemadefor this heteroscedasticity(see
Mullineaux 1978). Note that testing the cross-equation restriction 'Y == 'Y*
is equivalent to testing w == 0, in (5), since
(9) w==(ZlZ1)-lZ1(X-xe)==(ZlZ1)-lX
- (ZIZ 1) -1Zlxe == )' - "i*,
whereXl andxe are n x 1 vectors with X t and X~, respectively, in row t.
Similarly 2 1 is a matrix of n rows with 2 1,t-1 in row t.
Now suppose that Z2 is not empty, so that relevant variables are
excluded from (7) and (8). In this case, the estimates "i and "i* generally
will not be consistent estimates of a1 and ai, respectively, even if ex-
pectations are rational. However, rationality ofexpectationsstill implies
that plim "i == plim "i* because, as shown above, "i - "i* is numerically
equal to wand plimw == O. Another way to understand this finding is to
calculate the plims of "i and "i*. They are
(10) plim "i == a1 + (Z{Zl)-1ZiZ2a2,
(11) plim "i* == ai + (Zl Z1)-1 ~Z;lZ2a2·
Rationality implies that a1 == ai, 0.2 == 0.2, and hence plim "i == plim"i*.
As is obvious from (10) and (11), the equality of plim .y and plim .y*
reflects the equal asymptotic bias in the t\VO estimates.
This section has analyzed tests of rationality in the presence of some
observable measure of expectations. The general conclusion is that a
rejection of 'Y == 'Y* or, equivalently, of w := 0, is a rejection of rational
expectations regardless ofthe completeness ofthe information set speci-
fied byZl. Thetwo alternative proceduresdiscussed here arethustests of
rationality under quite general conditions.
In the absence of direct observations of expectations, we must infer
information on expectations from observed market behavior. The next
section discusses the use ofsecurityprice data to test for the rationalityof
expectations.
3.3 Test of Rationality and Market Efficit~ncy
The most common tests of rationality (efficiency) in capital markets
focus on the condition derived in the previous chapter:
(12)
whereYtis a one-period return for a security andYt is the expected return
generated from a model of market equilibrium. Equation (12) above
implies thatYt - Yi should be uncorrelated with any past information in
<Pt-l. It is the basis for a common test of Inarket efficiency (see Fama
1976a) in which the null hypothesis that a =: 0 is tested in the regression
equation below:48 Econometric Theory and Methodology
(13) Yt =Yt+ Zt-1a + J.Lt
where
2t- 1= variables contained in <1>t-1,
a = coefficients,
J.Lt = error term where E (J.Ltl<Pt-1) is assumed to equal zero.
A test ofthe null hypothesis that a = 0 is a test ofthe joint hypothesis
of market efficiency (rationality) and the model of market equilibrium,
no matter what past information is included in Z.
The "efficient-markets model" of the previous chapter that satisfies
(12) is:
(14) Yt = Yt + (Xt - X~)J3 + E t ,
where
Et = a scalar disturbance with the property E (Etl<Pt-1) = O-thus E is
serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with X~,
X t = the k-element row vector containing variables relevant to the
pricing of the security at time t,
X~ = the k-element row vector ofone-period-ahead rational forecasts
of Xt, that is, X~ = E(Xtl<Pt-l),
~ = k x 1 vector of coefficients.




"I = I x k matrix of coefficients.
U t = k-element row vector of disturbances where E(Utl<Pt-l) is
assumed to equal zero.
When we apply rational expectations, (14) becomes
(16) Yt = Yt + (Xt- Zt-l),*)J3 + Et ,
where "I = )'*.
The system of (15) and (16) can be estimated with the methodology
outlined in the previous chapter. The cross-equation constraints implied
by marketefficiency (rationality),)' = "1*, can betestedwith a likelihood
ratio test and are analogous to the rationality constraints for the regres-
sions (7) and (8). Although expectations are not directly observable, we
can test their rationality by maintaining the equilibrium model ofy and
the conditionthatonlycontemporaneousunanticipatedmovementsinX t
are correlated withYt - Yt. Any rejection ofthe constraint 'Y = )'* could
indicate a failure either of the rationality of expectations about X t or of(a)
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the maintained equilibrium model. This interpretation of such a test is
discussed in the previous chapter.
Two questions arise about the econometric properties of this proce-
dure. First, does it provide a test ofmarket e~fficiency(rationality) under
the maintained model ofYt even if Zt-1 excludes variables relevant to
forecasting X t?Second, whatis the relationofthis test to thecommontest
for market efficiency using equation (13)? l~hese questions are related;
the following theorem provides answers.
3.3.1 Theorem
Consider the system of equations
X t = Zt-1~+ Ut,
Yt = yi + (Xt - Zt-1 ~*)f3 -t- Et ,
where Xt is a k-element row vector, Zt-1 is an I-element row vector, Yt
andYt are scalars, ~ and ~* are I x k paranleter matrices, f3 is a k x 1
parametervector, Utis a k-elementrowvector, and Et is a scalar. Consider
also the equation
(b)
where ex is an I x 1 parameter vector. The quasi-likelihood ratio test of
the null hypothesis ~ = ~* in (a) is asymptotically equivalent to a quasi-F
test of the null hypothesis ex = 0 in (b). (The quasi-likelihood ratio and
quasi-Ftests are constructed as ifthe disturbances, Ut, Et, and f.Lt are i.i.d.
normal.)
Outline ofProof
(See Abel and Mishkin [1980] for a more detailed and formal proof.)
The key insight in the proofofthis theorem is to observe that the system
(a) can be rewritten-as
(17)
Yt =Yt+ (Xt - Zt-1 ~)f3 + AZt-1e+ Et ,
where e = (~ - ~*)f3. The null hypothesis ~ = ~* will be true only if
e = 0, and this constraint can be tested using the nonlinear least-squares
proceduresdescribed in the previous chapter. Theconstraint that ~ is the
same in both equations in (17) is not binding, so we can estimate the
parameters in (17) by OLS on each equation. Specifically, the estimate 'Y
is obtained by OLS on the first equation. TreatingYt as known, ~ ande
are obtainedfrom an OLS regression ofYt - YtonXt - Zt-1 'Y and Zt-1'
Since the residuals from the first equation in (17), X t - Zt-1 'Y, are
orthogonal to Zt-1 by construction, the estimate ofewill not be affected
if X t - Zt-1 'Y is omitted from the list ofregressors when OLS is applied
to the second equation in (17). Thus the t~stimate of e is numerically50 Econometric Theory and Methodology
identical to, and has the same distribution as, the OLS estimate of a in
(b). Although the test statistic associated with the null hypothesis a = 0
may differ in small samples from the test statistic associated with the null
hypothesis e = 0, these test statistics will be asymptotically equal.
3.3.2 Remarks
The theorem is valid regardless of the properties of the error terms u
and E. Ifthey are not i.i.d., the two testprocedureswill be asymptotically
equivalent, but neither will yield test statistics with the assumed asymp-
totic distributions. Ifthe contemporaneous correlation ofu and E is zero,
the OLS regression ofyonu(u = X - Z.y) and Z will provide consistent
estimates ofboth ~ and e. Ifthe contemporaneous correlation ofu and E
is unknown, then ~ is unidentified. Nevertheless, in this case the OLS
estimate ofeis still consistent and the theorem continues to apply. Since
~ is, ingeneral, unidentified, there is an alternative demonstration ofthis
theorem. The maximized value ofthe likelihood function is not affected
by an arbitrary choice of ~. Therefore, set ~ equal to zero, and observe
that we now have a seemingly unrelated system (Zellner 1~62) in which
the right-hand-side variables are identical in each equation. The esti-
mates of ~ and ethus can be obtained from OLS equation by equation.
Observe that the second equation in (17) contains a model of market
equilibrium. TheproofoutlinedabovetreatsYt as known. Ifit is unknown
and assumed to be a linear function of past variables Wt - l, then Wt - 1
must also be included as explanatory variables in the time series model
for Xt. The orthogonalityofthe residuals in the equations for X t with the
other right-hand-side variables in the second equation of (17) is thus
preserved, and the proof of the theorem may proceed as above. This
becomesclearintheproofofthecorollaryinSection3.4. Ofcourse,ifthe
coefficients of Wt - l in the model of market equilibrium are estimated,
then we cannot test the rationality restriction thatYt- Yt is uncorrelated
with Wt - l . The question of the testability of such restrictions has been
discussed in Appendix 2.1.
Observe also that e = (~ - ~*)~ is an I x 1 vector. Thus the test of
e = 0 (or, equivalently, a = 0) is a test of only I constraints. However,
there are I x k constraints in "I = "1*. Therefore, all these constraints are
testable only if k = 1. Even when k > 1, imposing the constraint ~ = ~*
places only I binding restrictions on the system in (a). For example,
consider the case in which I = k = 2. The system of equations can be
written as
(18) X lt = ~llZl,t-l + ~2lZ2,t-l + Ult,
X 2t = ~l2Zl,t-l + ~22Z2,t-l + U2t,
Yt = ~lXlt + ~2X2t - (~il~l + ~i2~2)Zl,t-l
-(~~l~l + ~~2~2)Z2,t-l + Et ·51 An Integrated View
The four parameters "Iij can be estimated from the first two equations. If
Cov(Et, Uit) is known to be zero, we can estilmate J31' J32, ("Ii\J31 + "I{2(32),
and ("I11J31 + "I12(32) from the third equation. Since we cannot estimate
the four elements "Iij, separately, we cannot separately test the four
restrictions "Iij == "Iij. However, we can test I == 2 linear combinations of
the rationality restrictions.
(19) for i == 1 and 2.
(20)
If we do not know the covariances of Et and Uit' then J31 and J32 are not
identified. However, we canstilltestwhetherthetwolinear combinations
above are equal to zero. To see this, rewrite the third equation as
Yt == [("111 - "I{1)J31 + ("112 - "Ii2)J32]Zl,t-l + [("121 - "I11)J31
+ ("122 - "I12)J32] Z2,t-1+ J31U1t + J32U2t + Et ·
Observe that the coefficients of Zl,t-1 and ~~2,t-1 in the rewritten equa-
tion are the testable linear combinations of rationality restrictions.
3.3.3 Implications
The most interesting implication ofthe above theorem is similar to the
finding in Section 3.2: a rejectionofthe cross-equation restriction "I == "I*
is a rejection ofmarket efficiency or, equivalently, rationality (maintain-
ing the model ofmarket equilibrium) whether or not the information set
in Zl is complete. This is demonstrated by noting that the test of "I == "1*
is asymptotically equivalent to the test of a == 0, which is clearly a test of
the efficient-markets condition (12), regardless ofwhat past information
is included in Z. However, if the model generating X t is not correctly
specified, then in general there is an errors-in-variables bias that leads to
inconsistent estimates of J3 and "I. Nonetheless, any asymptotic bias in -y
will be identical to that in -Y*.
The theorem implies further that rationality (or market efficiency)
does not ruleoutsignificant correlationsofYt - Yt with currentvariables.
Therefore, if information not available at time t - 1 is included in the
Zt-1 vector-as in earlier work mentioned in Chapter 2-then neither
procedure provides a test of rationality.
3.4 Tests of the Short-Run Neutrality of
Aggregate Demand Policy
Sargent (1976a) discusses tests of a classical equilibrium macroecono-
metric model with a Lucas (1973) supply function of the form
(21) Yt == Yt + (Xt - X~)J3 + Et ,52 Econometric Theory and Methodology
where
Yt = a scalar representing output or unemployment at time t,
Yt = theequilibrium (naturalrate)levelofoutputorunemployment at
time t,
X t = a k-element vector of aggregate demand variables, such as the
price level or the money supply at time t,
Et = scalar disturbance term with the property E(Etl<Pt-1) = o.
This equation has the neutrality property that only unanticipated
changes in Xt have an effect on Yt - Yt. Note that it is one form of the
MRE equation discussed in the precedingchapterand has the same form
as the efficient-markets model (14). As before, we must specify howYt,
theequilibriumlevelofoutputorunemployment,is calculatedinorderto
give the supply function empirical content. A particular specification
often used with the Lucas supply function is
(22)
Suppose that X t is generated by the forecasting model
L'
(23) Xt=Zt-1'Y+ I lfJiYt-i+Ut,
i= 1
where
Zt-1 = an I-element row vector ofpredeterminedvariables otherthan
lagged Yt,
"I = an I x k matrix of coefficients,
llJi = a k-element row vector of coefficients.
Note that (23) has the same form as the forecasting model (15) in the
preceding section, except that in (23) we distinguish between lagged
values of Yt and other predetermined variables. We assume for the
momentthat E(Utl<Pt-1) = 0 and combine (21)-(23) to obtain thesystem
L'
(24) Xt=Zt-1'Y+ I lfJiYt-i+Ut,
i=l
( L') L
Yt = Xt- Zt-1"1* - i:1 tVtYt-i ~ + i:1 AiYt-i + Et
with the cross-equation rationality constraints "I = "1* and \fJi = tVt, i = 1,
. . . , ~. Any rejection ofthese constraints could indicate a violation of
the null hypothesis of rationality, or ofthe maintained hypothesis ofthe
equilibrium model.
Sargent (1976a) uses Granger (1969) causality tests to test the joint
hypothesis of rationality of expectations and the equilibrium model de-
scribed in (21) in (22) above, which embodies the neutrality of antici-
pated policy. Substituting (22) into (21) and taking expectations con-
ditional on <Pt- 1, we have53
(25)
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Inotherwords, theoptimallinearforecast forYt does notbenefitfrom the
use ofother information besides past y's. H'ence, the equilibrium model
in Sargent (1976a) requires that any past information, Zt-1, fails to
Granger-causeYt. Specifically, if OLS is used to estimate the parameters
Vi and 0'. in the regression equation,
(26)
L'
Yt= I ViYt-i+ Zt-10'.+fJJt,
i=1
where L' ;::: L, the estimate of 0'. should not differ significantlyfrom zero.
The relationship betweentests ofthe cross-equationconstraints in (24)
and the Granger-causality test in (26) is rnade clear by the following
corollary.
Corollary
If I.: ;::: L, then a quasi-likelihood ratio test ofthe null hypothesis ~ =
~* in (24) is asymptotically equivalent to a quasi-F test of the null
hypothesis that 0'. = 0 in (26).
Outline ofProof











where 80 = (~- ~*)~and8i = (lfJi -lfJt)fori = 1,... ,I.:, andit can be
estimated by OLS on each equation. Note that since ei and Ai are both
coefficients of Yt-i in (27), the separate parameters ei and Ai are not
identified for i ::; L. Hence, the constraints lfJi = lfJt for i ::; L are not
testable. In order to test the testable cross-equation restrictions, the
system (27) can be estimated by OLS on each equation, as explained in
the proof of the theorem in Section 3.3. Since the estimated residuals
from thefirst equationwill be orthogonalto ;~t-1 andYt- i for i = 1,... ,
I.:, the deletion ofthis residual vector from the second equation will not
affect the OLS estimatesofthe coefficients onZt-1 andYt-i. Hence, as in
the previous proof, the least-squares estimates of 0'. and eo will be numer-54 Econometric Theory and Methodology
ically identical, and the test statistics associated with the null hypotheses
a = 0 and eo = 0 will be asymptotically equal.
Remarks
Obviously, OLS cannot be applied directly to the second equation of
(27) as it is written since for i :5 L, Yt-i appears twice on the right-hand
side because we must estimate the parameters of-the Yt model. OLS can
be used after this equation has been rewritten to eliminate the perfect
collinearity of right-hand-side variables. Thus we cannot obtain testable
restrictions on tVt for i = 1,... ,L. However, the constraintse i = 0 and
hence tVi = tVt for i = L + 1, ... , L' are testable with the identifying
restriction that the lag length L in (22) is shorter than the lag length Z; in
(23). This seems a rather strong assumption to impose on the basis of a
priori knowledge, and one should be cautious in interpreting results
based on estimates of 8i in this case.
Implications
It is important to consider the effects ofspecifying the list ofvariables
included in Zt-l incorrectly. Irrelevant predetermined variables in Zt-l
will not lead to inconsistent parameter estimates but will, in general,
reduce the power of tests. On the other hand, excluding relevant vari-
ables from Zt-l will lead to a breakdown of the assumption that
E(utl<f>t-l) = 0, and will lead to inconsistent estimates of "Y. Even in this
case, however, any rejection ofthe constraint "Y = "Y* in (24) indicates a
failure of rationality, or of the equilibrium model which embodies neu-
trality, since a rejectionofthis constraintindicatesthatZ Granger-causes
y. As demonstrated above, this implication holds regardless of the in-
formation included in Z.
The procedure outlined therefore provides a test of the joint hypoth-
esis of rationality and the equilibrium model, even if relevant predeter-
mined variables are omitted from Zt-l. This result can be used to show
that Lucas's (1972) conjecture that tests of neutrality cannot be con-
ducted when there is a change in policy regime is not always correct. If
there are two policy regimes in the sample period 1 to T with the break
occurring at T1, then there is a separate forecasting equation for each
regime: for example,
(28) X t = Zt-l"Yl + Ult
Xt = Zt-l"Y2 + U2t
for t = 1 to T1 - 1,
for t = T1 to T.
Using dummy variables, we can write one forecasting equation for both
regimes:




~ = "12 - "11
for t = 1 to T1 - 1
for t = T1 to T
for t = 1 to T1 - 1
for t = J'1 to T
Neglecting to take account of a change in policy regime is, therefore,
equivalent to omitting the relevant set of variables Z7- 1 from the fore-
casting equation. But as we have seen, even ifZt-l excludes this relevant
information because its variables are chosen without considering the
change in policy regime, a test of the cross-equation restriction "I = "1*
continues to be a test of the joint hypothesis enbodying neutrality. An
importantcaveat, however, needs to be mentioned. The change in policy
regime could alter the populationvariances ofthe errorterms in boththe
forecasting equation and the output or unenlployment equations. Unless
attention is devoted to correcting potential heteroscedasticity that can
arise as a result, the test statistics may lead to misleading inference.
McCallum (1979a) and Nelson (1979) ernphasize the point raised by
Sargent (1973, 1976b) that the Granger-causality tests are tests of the
neutralityofanticipatedpolicy only if (1) laggedvalues ofX t - X~ do not
enter the supply function (21), or (ii) the disturbance Et in (21) is serially
uncorrelated. Thatis, ifeitherofthesetwo conditionsdoesnothold, then
it is possible for Z to Granger-cause y even though anticipated policy is
neutral.
Theanalysis inthe presentchapterdemonstratesthesepointsalso. The
corollary above breaks down if there are lagged surprises in (21) and
hence in (24). Although the contemporaneous residual from the first
equation in (27) is, by construction, orthogonal to Zt-l and Yt-i, the
lagged residuals are not. Thus, the test of "I = "1* will no longer be
equivalent to a Granger-causality test. Granger-causality will no longer
be a test of the joint hypothesis of rationality and the model of equilib-
rium output.
Now consider the case in which only contemporaneous innovations in
X t appear in (21) and (24), but Et is serially correlated, implying that f.Lt is
serially correlated. Here, the corollary holds and the Granger-causality
test is asymptoticallyequivalentto the test of"I = "1*. However, since the
right-hand sides of both (24) and (26) include lagged dependent vari-
ables, theestimatesofa and eo will no longerbeconsistent. Teststatistics
from both procedures are invalid in this case. To obtain valid test statis-
tics for the joint hypothesis, we correct the supplyfunction (21) for serial
correlation by quasi-differencing and generate specification with a seri-56 Econometric Theory and Methodology
ally uncorrelated error. The resulting specification will contain lagged as
well as current X t - X~. We are then dealing with the case above where
the Granger-causality test is no longer a test of the joint hypothesis.
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
The framework in this chapter ties together a range ofissues in testing
rationality, financial market efficiency, and the short-run neutrality of
aggregate demand policy. Two main themes stand out in this integrated
framework:
1. Thecross-equationtests ofrationality, marketefficiency, andshort-
run neutrality discussed here are asymptotically equivalent to more com-
mon single-equation regression tests.
2. The exact specification of the relevant information set used in
rational forecasts is not necessary for the cross-equation tests ofrational-
ity, market efficiency, and short-run neutrality to have desirable asymp-
totic properties.